Publications
"The Aesthetic Engagement Theory of Art", Ergo, forthcoming
I introduce and explicate a new functionalist account of art, namely that something is an artwork if and only if the fulfillment of its function by a subject requires that the subject aesthetically engage it. I show how this theory outperforms salient rival theories in terms of extensional adequacy, non-arbitrariness, and ability to account for the distinctive value of art. I also give an account of what it is to aesthetically engage a work that relies on our agential capacity to treat an object as having non-instrumental value, even while the ultimate purpose for our engaging the object is to get something from it.
I introduce and explicate a new functionalist account of art, namely that something is an artwork if and only if the fulfillment of its function by a subject requires that the subject aesthetically engage it. I show how this theory outperforms salient rival theories in terms of extensional adequacy, non-arbitrariness, and ability to account for the distinctive value of art. I also give an account of what it is to aesthetically engage a work that relies on our agential capacity to treat an object as having non-instrumental value, even while the ultimate purpose for our engaging the object is to get something from it.
"Mediated Predication in Aristotle’s Categories", Ancient Philosophy, forthcoming
In order to solve a debate over whether non-substantial particulars are recurrent or not, some commentators on Aristotle’s Categories have proposed a distinction in two ways that predication relations hold according to Aristotle. I elaborate on this view, distinguishing between direct and mediated predication in Aristotle’s Categories. I present the textual case for the direct/mediated distinction from the text and then show how the distinction can be used both to solve a trenchant problem for the traditional view of non-substantial particulars and to articulate a novel way of understanding recurrence.
In order to solve a debate over whether non-substantial particulars are recurrent or not, some commentators on Aristotle’s Categories have proposed a distinction in two ways that predication relations hold according to Aristotle. I elaborate on this view, distinguishing between direct and mediated predication in Aristotle’s Categories. I present the textual case for the direct/mediated distinction from the text and then show how the distinction can be used both to solve a trenchant problem for the traditional view of non-substantial particulars and to articulate a novel way of understanding recurrence.
"How to Understand the Completion of Art", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 78 (2): 197-208 (2020)
Every theorist who has offered a theory of artwork completion has assumed there’s only one way for an artwork to be complete. I argue that’s false. Extant theories of artwork completion fail. The reason is that there are many ways for artworks to be complete. What we need is a theory of artwork completions that enumerates and explicates the multiple ways an artwork can be complete.
Every theorist who has offered a theory of artwork completion has assumed there’s only one way for an artwork to be complete. I argue that’s false. Extant theories of artwork completion fail. The reason is that there are many ways for artworks to be complete. What we need is a theory of artwork completions that enumerates and explicates the multiple ways an artwork can be complete.
"Debugging the Case for Creationism", Philosophical Studies, 177 (11): 3509–3527 (2020)
Creationism about musical works (easily altered to include other repeatable artworks) is the view that when someone composes a musical work, they thereby create some object. The Case for Creationism is a collection of arguments proceeding from various observations about features of musical works to the conclusion that Creationism is true. I show that the Case for Creationism is a dialectical failure (whether or not it’s sound). In each case when a Creationist offers an argument for the created, historical nature of musical works, the argument proceeds by way of two premises: (1) musical works have some salient feature F, and (2) Musical works could have F only if they were created. In each case, one of the premises is naturally denied by the opponent of Creationism.
Creationism about musical works (easily altered to include other repeatable artworks) is the view that when someone composes a musical work, they thereby create some object. The Case for Creationism is a collection of arguments proceeding from various observations about features of musical works to the conclusion that Creationism is true. I show that the Case for Creationism is a dialectical failure (whether or not it’s sound). In each case when a Creationist offers an argument for the created, historical nature of musical works, the argument proceeds by way of two premises: (1) musical works have some salient feature F, and (2) Musical works could have F only if they were created. In each case, one of the premises is naturally denied by the opponent of Creationism.
Works Under Review
[Title Omitted for Review]
When does a story count as a work of fiction? I argue that a story is a work of fiction to the degree that it’s made up. This conflicts with popular theories of fictionality that construe it as a property a work has if and only if (or just only if) the work is a prop for producing imaginings in people. It also conflicts with the genre theory of fiction, on which there are no necessary or sufficient conditions for something's being a work of fiction. I show how the fabrication theory better explains our talk of fiction, our practices concerning fiction and non-fiction, and classifies the cases correctly. I also give a theory of what it is for a story to count as made up.
When does a story count as a work of fiction? I argue that a story is a work of fiction to the degree that it’s made up. This conflicts with popular theories of fictionality that construe it as a property a work has if and only if (or just only if) the work is a prop for producing imaginings in people. It also conflicts with the genre theory of fiction, on which there are no necessary or sufficient conditions for something's being a work of fiction. I show how the fabrication theory better explains our talk of fiction, our practices concerning fiction and non-fiction, and classifies the cases correctly. I also give a theory of what it is for a story to count as made up.
[Title Omitted for Review]
If God cares about us and is able to answer our prayers, then why do our prayers often go unanswered? We argue that the problem of unanswered prayer closely parallels the problem of evil, and we use this parallel as a guide, both to develop a powerful argument from unanswered prayer against theism, and to introduce a handful of potential responses to that argument.
If God cares about us and is able to answer our prayers, then why do our prayers often go unanswered? We argue that the problem of unanswered prayer closely parallels the problem of evil, and we use this parallel as a guide, both to develop a powerful argument from unanswered prayer against theism, and to introduce a handful of potential responses to that argument.
Works in Progress
"Reply to Rohrbaugh" (invited response in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism)
Guy Rohrbaugh has critiqued my pluralist theory of artwork completion. I defend the theory and offer some additional reasons for favoring it.
Guy Rohrbaugh has critiqued my pluralist theory of artwork completion. I defend the theory and offer some additional reasons for favoring it.
"Making up Stories"
I ask what it is to make up a story. In order to answer the question I examine what the existence and identity conditions for stories are, drawing parallels with the existence and identity conditions for words. I argue that stories are individuated strictly by their content, but I provide a contextualist semantics for story identity attributions. I argue that making up a story amounts to identifying original narrative content.
I ask what it is to make up a story. In order to answer the question I examine what the existence and identity conditions for stories are, drawing parallels with the existence and identity conditions for words. I argue that stories are individuated strictly by their content, but I provide a contextualist semantics for story identity attributions. I argue that making up a story amounts to identifying original narrative content.
"What is the Story of Your Life?"
I identify a kind of value of a life distinct from either well-being or hedonic value. I call it narrative value. People want their lives to make a good story. I argue that narrative value is not reducible to the quantity of hedonic value or well-being in a life. Instead, it can be identified with a structural property that a life has in virtue of the distribution of other values in the life.
I identify a kind of value of a life distinct from either well-being or hedonic value. I call it narrative value. People want their lives to make a good story. I argue that narrative value is not reducible to the quantity of hedonic value or well-being in a life. Instead, it can be identified with a structural property that a life has in virtue of the distribution of other values in the life.
"Becoming Art"
I argue that artwork is a phase sortal. That is, something can go from not being an artwork to being an artwork without any substantial change. This follows from the Aesthetic Engagement Theory of art (as well as some other, similar theories) in combination with an observation about sortal change via appropriation. I show how this view has consequences for our ontology of art, our response to puzzles of material constitution, and our understanding of the nature of artistic activity.
I argue that artwork is a phase sortal. That is, something can go from not being an artwork to being an artwork without any substantial change. This follows from the Aesthetic Engagement Theory of art (as well as some other, similar theories) in combination with an observation about sortal change via appropriation. I show how this view has consequences for our ontology of art, our response to puzzles of material constitution, and our understanding of the nature of artistic activity.
"Brutal Aesthetics"
I introduce a puzzle about brutality: namely that it often seems to be a bad-making feature of actions and objects, while on the other hand there are actions and objects that derive their aesthetic value solely or importantly from their brutality. I introduce an account of brutality that explains why it can sometimes be a bad-making feature of actions or objects, while other times a valuable aesthetic property.
I introduce a puzzle about brutality: namely that it often seems to be a bad-making feature of actions and objects, while on the other hand there are actions and objects that derive their aesthetic value solely or importantly from their brutality. I introduce an account of brutality that explains why it can sometimes be a bad-making feature of actions or objects, while other times a valuable aesthetic property.